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1. THE SET-THEORETICAL SCHOOL 
1.1. General Remarks 
It is a rare event in the humanities when a scholar accepts the task of presenting, 
analyzing, and evaluating the entire research work of a certain area in his 
scientific discipline. However, it is perhaps even more unusual to find that such 
a survey reopens a discussion just about every historiographer in the field would 
have declared a closed chapter but that, when reconsidered, shows promising 
perspectives for future research work. 
The monumental two-volume monography Case and Gender by Dutch linguist 
Andries van Helden is one such event. The book is concerned with the "principles, 
methods, and empirical work of an East European linguistic tradition which is 
referred to as the Kulagina School or the Set-theoretical School" (p. 1). One 
of the maior trends in Soviet structuralist linguistics, the Set-theoretical School 1 
consisted of more than 50 scientists - -  mostly linguists and mathematicians 
- -  who were especially interested in certain aspects of morphosyntax, such 
as the definition and the delimitation of 'case', 'gender' and other notions of 
traditional linguistics. Although it seems that some of their central ideas can be 
traced back to the 1920s (p. 1115, esp. fn. 1), all published research work of 
the school dates from the mid-1950s to the t970s. According to the author, the 
abundant work in this field was possible thanks to a "fluctuation i  Soviet science 
policy" (p. 1t76) where the exact sciences and mathematical methods had a high 
prestige among science policy makers who expected pathbreaking new results in 
automatic language processing and translation. 
The most eminent contributors to the school were the mathematician A.N. 
Kolmogorov as its intellectual initiator 2, I.I. Revzin as its most prolific thinker, 
A.V. Gladkij, A.A. Zaliznjak, ES. Kuznecov, R.L. Dobrugin, O.S. Revzina in the 
former Soviet Union; for the other East-European countries, S. Marcus (Romania), 
L. Nebesk3~, J. Horeck~ (former Czechoslovakia), A. Trybulec (Poland). 
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1.2. Some Basic" Concepts 
Any discussion of van Helden's book requires at least a vague idea of the general 
methodology represented in it. Since such knowledge cannot be presupposed on 
the part of the reader, I will preliminarily try to introduce to the reader some 
basic concepts typical of the Set-theoretical School. 
The work of the school was chiefly dedicated to the systematic and formal 
explication of some central concepts in traditional linguistics, in particular c a s e 
and gender ,  butalso par t  o f  speech ,  parad igm and some others. The 
exponents of the school were looking for i g o r o u s and c o n s i s t e n t answers 
to questions as the famous following ones proposed originally by Kolmogorov 
(cf. p. 138): 
• What exactly do we mean when we say that two words are in the same 
case? 
• How many cases does the Russian language possess? 
The answers to questions like these, as were tentatively formulated by represen- 
tatives of the Set-theoretical School, are usually more or less rigidly formulated 
mode l  s 3. In these models, some mathematical primitives, usually sets, or 
sets of sets, are associated with certain basic linguistic concepts that must be 
considered somehow given - -  e.g. the set of sentences of a language L, or the 
set of nouns in L. These mathematical primitives are then used as a basis for 
deriving complex formal objects (mostly sets again), which, in the researcher's 
intention, are to correspond to some more sophisticated notion of grammatical 
description, e.g. 'case in L' or 'gender in L'. 
1.3. Example: A Simple Model for 'Case in L' 
For the purpose of familiarizing the reader with the specific kind of intellectual 
approach so characteristic of Set-theoretical works I will here informally outline 
a simple example of a model for 'case in a language L'. 
Let us assume that the following formal concepts are given as primitives in a 
description of a specific language L: 
1. Set N of nominal lexemes (nouns) in L. Nouns may have different 
(morphological) word forms; information on these is not contained in 
N. 
2. Set C of contexts in L, where contexts might simply be sentences in 
some phonological representation "with a gap" into which word forms 
of the nouns in N can be inserted to yield complete, but not necessarily 
well-formed sentences of L. Let us say that a context a d m i t s a word 
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form of a noun n E N provided that the resulting complete sentence is 
well-formed. Contexts could also be dependency / constituent structures 
with a 'vacant space' or whatever epresentation f incomplete sentences 
is possible in linguistics. Contexts may admit more than one word form of 
an n E N or none at all. 
3. Function F 4, which for each n E N yields the set F(n). The elements of 
F(n) are sets Fffn), F2(n) .... (subindices are given only for convenience), 
where each Fi(n) is a set of contexts (i.e., a subset of C). In the simplest 
case, each F~(n) is just a set of contexts that all admit the same word form 
of n (where nothing is said about other word forms of n that elements 
of Fi(n) might also admit). With nouns, however, word form is, as a 
rule, determined, not only by case, but also by additional factors (gender, 
number, possessor affixes, sandhi, gender of governing noun, phonological 
features...). In this case it is to be assumed that all noun word form 
conditioning factors e x c e p t c a s e are already knownS; then we might 
say that a Fi(n) contains all contexts in which the admitted word form of 
n can be predicted accord ing  to a ru le  that  re fe rs  on ly  to 
the  above-ment ioned  add i t iona l  fac tors ,  butnot, ofcourse, 
to case itself; the rule might be valid only for this very noun n. If a context 
in Fi(n), for reasons of 'case syncretism' admits more than one word form 
of n for a particular combination of the additional factors, then the rule for 
Fi(n) must predict (at least) one of them. Intuitively, the F~(n) are areas of 
homogeneous morphological coding for n. 
For a Russian example, take n = omeu,. Then there will be a Fv(n) containing 
all contexts ubject o the following word form assignment rule: 
- -  SINGULAR [if possible in the context] -. omu~y 
- -  PLURAL [if possible in the context] ~ ornu, a.,u 
Obviously, there is only one 'additional factor' for Russian nouns, viz. 
number. Another set, t~)(n), will contain all contexts with the following 
word form assignment rule: 
- -  SINGULAR [if possible in the context] ~ omt4a 
- -  PLURAL [if possible in the context] ~ ornt4o~ 
It should be clear that Fi(n) represents, in a way, the dative case of omeu, 
whereas F/n) is a 'genitive-accusative' of this noun. 
Let us call X(n) the set of contexts not admitting any word form of n (= not 
appearing in any Fi(n)). 
Let us call a subset H of C homogeneous if it contains, for any noun E N, only 
contexts that belong to one particular F~(n), and contexts belonging to X(n). Thus, 
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homogeneous sets are sets of homogeneous morphological coding for all nouns. 
Let us call a homogeneous set H a case if it is maximal, i.e., if the addition of 
any further context c E C to H would yield a non-homogeneous set. 
This way, we have defined cases as sets of contexts, not as sets of word forms. 
This has been a common, but not the only possible, practice in set-theoretical 
linguistics. Note that a context can belong to several cases. In this instance our 
simple case model cannot ell us which case we are dealing with in a particular 
sentence. - -  In order to give the reader a flavour of the kind of mathematical 
formalism to be encountered in the study, I will present a formalization of the 
model. Set H of homogeneous sets in language L is defined as follows: 
H={H1HcC^ A V A (c@Fvc@X(n))} 
hEN FEF(n) c~H 
Set C of cases in L is then defined as follows: 
C=(HIH~H^-- - ,Vc~c H U (c} ~H} 
A point van Helden does not really stress in his study is that the formalism of 
a model is neutral with respect o the linguistic interpretation of its primitive 
components. Thus, take C to be the set of noun lexemes of L, N to be the set of 
contexts, and assume F(n) to contain, for a given context n E N, those nouns of C 
that are admitted in n or not admitted fo r  o ther  than  gender  agreement  
m i s m a t c h r e a s o n . One will see easily that, in this interpretation, C is 
the set of g e n d e r s in L. Other interpretations for the model are not difficult 
to find; indeed, one could argue that this model formalizes essential properties 
of g r a m m a t i c a 1 c a t e g o r i e s in general. The special feature of this model 
is what I call its descr ip t ive  s tab i l i ty .  For this, see section 3.3. The 
problem of additional factors interfering with the concept to be modelled, a 
problem typical of set-theoretical models, is circumvented in this model, simply 
because it is relegated to the interpretation of the primitive F, which takes place, 
if at a11, in some other module of a more complete description of the language. 
An example will be helpful to understand the foregoing. Take the Russian 
accusative, which is 'triggered' by, among others, the following contexts: 
(1) H eoeoplo npo ..... 
(2) H ne 8u~cy ..... 
(3) H n.ga6ato e ..... 
The reader will easily verify that, theoretically 6, any Russian noun can be 
inserted into (is admitted by) these three contexts appearing in one and the same 
word form, namely, the form usually called the accusative case form. Idealizing 
somewhat, let us ignore, for the sake of this example, the existence of plural 
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forms for Russian nouns (as well as the existence of p 1 u r a 1 i a t a n t u m ) in 
order to approximate he 'simplest case' mentioned above, wifla noun morphology 
reflecting only 'case distinctions' in a pretheoretical sense of this term. We can, 
then, conclude that the set containing contexts (1)-(3) is a homogeneous set 
according to our definition. Now have a look at 
(4) Oft t - taxoOumcst  ~ . . . . .  
As (3) admits accusative and locative case forms v - -  with a difference in 
meaning, of course -,  context (4), which exclusively admits locative forms, 
forms a homogeneous set together with (3), but not with (1) or (2). (2), on the 
other hand, is the only one of the given contexts to yield a homogeneous set 
together with 
(5) Heau omxa3a.acs t  om . . . . .  
To such homogeneous sets further contexts can be added until any further 
enlargement of such a set would lead to non-homogeneity of the resulting set. 
These maximal sets, then, are termed c a s e s 8. The reader should be aware 
of the fact that some reasoning along these lines is already understood in such 
seemingly easy statements a "The nouns of the Latin o-declension have identical 
forms in the dative and ablative singular (plural)". 
2. THE BOOK: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 
2.1 .  S t ructure  
The monograph consists of two volumes. Volume I starts off with a preface (pp. 
v-x) containing information on the object of the study, its lengthy history that 
began in 19759, too recent publications not taken into consideration ~°, and a brief 
summary of what van Helden takes to be the major outcome of the study. 
On pp. xi-xiii the reader finds an excellent overview of the notational conven- 
tions adopted throughout the book. The author numbers 'examples / statements', 
'formulas / constructs', and 'figures / tables' separately for each subsection, so 
that, e.g., (3.2.12.10) means 'example / statement number 10 in section 12 of 
chapter 2 of part 3'. Van Helden makes extensive use of cross-referring; one 
reason for this is that examples are never repeated within a chapter for the 
sake of economy. At times, this complicates reading the book considerably, esp. 
in volume II, so that it will be useful to memorize some often-used examples 
together with their eference quadrupel numbers. 
Some details worth mentioning: all non-English linguistic material is provided 
with a literal English translation; the Russian examples have been transliterated 
with full accentuation marking throughout; quotations are always in English - -  if 
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they have been translated by van Helden, they are marked with a dagger symbol 
(t). References are given in an absolutely systematic and consistent manner and 
often contain information on the exact location of cited passages or texts referred 
to, as to chapter or part of the cited publication. 
Volume I contains a detailed 12-page table of contents (p. viv-xxv) for both 
volumes. The main text itself is organized in seven parts. Parts 0-3 are contained 
in volume I (p. 1-566), parts 4-6 in volume II (p. 567-1200). At the end of volume 
II, there are three appendices (A-C) on pp. 120t-1221, which will be commented 
on later, as well as a 46-page list of references and names Mth some t500 entries 
(p. 1222-1268) not even meant o be an exhaustive bibliography but only "the top 
of the iceberg" (p. xiii). Each entry lists the pages on which van Helden quotes 
the respective publication 11or mentions the respective person. 
There is no glossary, but an index of technical terms appearing in the study 
(p. 1269-78), page numbers referring "to the places where the most user-friendly 
information about a term is given" (p. xiii) 12. It should be mentioned that the 
author often refers back to the first occurence of a term when it reappears in the 
text, which is certainly helpful for the reader. A very short Russian rrsum6 is 
found on p. 1279-80. 
All in all, the book has been carefully edited. A list of about 120 errata 
is supplied with the volumes. I found some 60 further minor misprints in the 
text. Since accuracy in mathematical formulas is essential in a study like this, I 
have taken special care in checking the mathematics in the book; all errors and 
misprints in formulas and formal symbols I found are listed in appendix I. In 
about en instances I detected serious mathematical inconsistencies. 
2.2. Objectives 
van Helden's study has been designed as a contribution to a general history 
of Soviet linguistics. In particular, it endeavours to make the huge output of 
the Kulagina School accessible to a wider audience by removing a number of 
difficulties that have been deterring linguists from occupying themselves with 
this short-lived linguistic tradition. 
First, the book acquaints the reader with the (well-digested) contents of a 
wealth of otherwise more or less inaccessible publications. A special feature is 
the reprint of a paper by V.A. Uspenskij (1957/1993) as ppendix A (p. 1201-6). 
This hardly attainable article mentioned already in note 2 sums up Kolmogorov's 
ideas on case and plays a crucial role in part 5 of the monograph (see section 
2.3.6). 
Second, the language of presentation is English. Thanks to the diligent 
preparation and translation of the example material, which usually stems from 
East European languages, esp. Russian, Polish, and Romanian, it could be read 
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even by someone who only knows English. In view of the linguistic intricacies 
of the example languages, uch a person is still likely to have a hard time finding 
his way through t e book. 
Third, the author has been highly successfhl in developing a unified mathe- 
matical metalanguage (as a 'frame of reference') in which all models under 
discussion are presented. This implies that he had to convert he wildly differing 
formalisms found in the literature (if any formalization was given there at all!) into 
his own without altering their mathematical properties - -  at times a formidable 
task. This enabled him, and will enable others, to compare different approaches 
systematically and fruitfully. The mathematical concepts employed are carefully 
introduced (see section 2.3.2). Usually, formal definitions are preceded by an 
informal paraphrase that makes the mathematics more comprehensible. Still, it 
would be pointless (if not plainly impossible) to skip all formulas in reading 
the book. A penetrative mind and some experience in mathematics will still be 
helpful to understand how certain formal definitions actually work. 
Fourth, the author thoroughly reviews every single proposal he presents, 
adduces further linguistic material to find defects in them and to assess their sci- 
entific viability in depth. More than once, he proposes ophisticated modifications 
of existing frameworks and demonstrates their advantages, thereby treating the 
school "as if it were a living tradition" (p. 5) in order to improve its theoretical 
foundations. 
In sum, even if it takes tthe reader a minimum of, say, 100 hours to work 
up the whole monograph, t is still does not compare in the least to the almost 
insurmountable difficulties in obtaining and digesting the original literature, which 
certainly would not provide him with such a careful comparative assessment as
found in van Helden's tudy. 
2.3. Survey of the Book 
Between 50 and 100 models are introduced and discussed, depending on how 
one counts the ramifications and modifications investigated, which are numerous 
especially for the more sophisticated models. It is obvious that none of these can 
be dealt with in depth here. I shall confine myself to giving an overview of the 
book in this section and discussing some basic methodological aspects of general 
interest in section 3. 
2.3.1. Part O: The Context 
The introductory chapter (p. 1-137) introduces the object of the study in its broader 
historical context. The author states (p. 2) that his style of presentation is meant 
to be ant i -p resent i s t ,  that is, the matter is expounded with, as Russell has 
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it, 'hypothetical sympathy', adopting tentatively the historical context of ideas 
instead of taking the point of view of today's culture and science. Obviously, 
this is the only reasonable option, since an unbiased 'view from inside' will 
probably turn out to be a necessary precondition for a sound comparison of the 
set-theoretical framework to another one. The author consistently adheres to his 
anti-presentist principle throughout the study. 
The socio-economic context is left out of consideration i  the main body of the 
book (p. 5). Instead, the external conditions during the short life of the school are 
thoroughly illuminated within the context of the history of Soviet linguistics (p. 
7-132). The evaluation of this part falls out of my personal competence, however. 
Suffice it to say that van Helden's lengthy account provides the reader with a 
profusion of facts (concerning a time span ranging from the beginnings of Marrism 
up to the present) and with a network of highly original speculations concerning 
causal interconnections between these facts. It is written in a remarkably broad 
perspective, with strong personal commitment, pugnacious, easoned with wit 
and sarcasm. About 60 pages (p. 39-101) are dedicated to the famous 1950 
Pravda debate and Stalin's contribution to it. Perhaps it wouldn't have been 
necessary to discuss the matter in this depth; nevertheless, the author is able to 
come up with an original interpretation f the affair, based on some ideas from 
Vinatrel 1950: 
1. Not so much concerned with linguistics, though to some extent successfully 
pretending to be (Stalin as the ~:opuc]get2 6cex ttay~c), Stalin's article 
conveyed irectives for the inner party circles and the bureaucracy and 
propaganda apparatus in an iconically encoded way ('/Esopian language', 
p. 90 sqq.); thus, A.A. Arakreev, who is often mentioned in Stalin's article, 
was just an icon for A.A. Zdanov, who had died in 1948; the latter was 
charged with producing ideology instead of leaving this crucial task to 
Stalin himself (p. 91). 
2. The philosopher G.F. Aleksandrov was the "real sculptor of the Pravda 
discussion as a public relations event" (p. 100), trying "to play a trick on 
Ju.A. 7_xlanov", A.A. Zdanov's on. 
Part I closes with a short outlook on the study. 
2.3.2. Part 1: Methodological Considerations 
The author's carefulness in questions of methodology is one of the most excellent 
features of the study. For the most part, in discussions on theoretical problems, 
all possible alternatives are sorted out and evaluated together with their impli- 
cations. In part 1 of the book (p. 138-255), which deals with the concept of 
a 'set-theoretical linguistic model' and the internal structure of such models, a 
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particularly large number of concepts are discriminated to yield the backbone of 
a highly sophisticated methodological discussion. 
Basically, the linguist{c terminology adopted in such models is liable to a 
prescr ip t ive ,  or, alternatively, to a descr ip t ive  treatment (p. i42 sqq.). 
In the former case, a fixed 'a priori' system of linguistic terms which are defined 
with reference to one another is imposed on the empirical data; in the latter case, 
terminology is constructed to approximate an assumed metalinguisfic reality 
reflected in the data. van Helden does not vote for either option, but proposes 
to develop a frame of reference within which "an ideal linguistic thesaurus 
which provides a descr ip t ion  of p rescr ip t ive  sys tems,  a catalogue 
of models" (p. 147; emphasis mine, RM.) can be formulated. Within this frame 
of reference, set-theoretical models are, as a hypothesis, assumed to consist of 
five components (p. 148) which are discussed from a methodological standpoint 
in the main body of part 1. 
The first component comprises the t e c h n i c a 1 c o n n e c t i v e s, which 
are taken to be representable in notions of set theory and mathematical logic. 
Consequently, part 1 includes a self-contained introduction into the notions of 
(naive) set-theory and logic as needed in the study (p. 153-t90). This introduction 
is tailored well to the needs of a beginner, apart from some minor lapses 13, but is 
still difficult enough to require careful study. Complex notions are often illustrated 
in an illuminating way, taking examples from dialect geography to account for 
some of the most complicated notions (such as 'transitive closure of a tolerance 
relation', p. 171). 
A further component (in van Helden's counting, the fifth), the rea l i ty  
c 1 a i m s of the model, is not described separately, but discussed in relation to 
each of the other components. Reality claims for a component of a model can be 
s p e c i f i  c or e m p t y ,  depending on whether some correspondence between 
the component and "aspects of reality" (p. 194) is asserted or not. 
In this connection, the author draws a crucial difference between r e I a t i o n a 1, 
a 1 g o r i t h m i c and c a 1 c u 1 u s models, depending on the reality claims made 
for the technical connectives (p. 195-8); his definitions remain somewhat vague, 
however, further discussion being scattered about various places in part 1. 
Summing up, the following may be said. 
1. If the technical connectives (henceforth, TC) simply statically denote 
abstract relations between concepts of a model, it then is relational. All 
(primitive or derived) concepts of the model are elaborated in terms of 
their mutual formal relationships. Van Helden's default interpretation of the 
set-theoretical models discussed in his study is relational. 
2. If the TC describe instructions (say, for a machine) that 'change reality', the 
model is algorithmic. Take, for example, mechanical discovery procedures 
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as discussed in American Structuralism. In algorithmic models, derived 
concepts can be constructed in a finite number of steps out of the primitives 
of the theory. 
3. If the TC denote the mere p o s s i b i 1 i t y of executing a certain process or 
action in reality, we have to do with a calculus model. In such models, all 
concepts or notions must be considered given; they are used to derive sen- 
tences and can only implicitly be characterized in terms of their respective 
roles in possible derivations (= sequences of possible processes). 
van Helden identifies calculus models with generative grammars and uses 
this identification as a basis for some very interesting attacks against the 
generative paradigm. The equation 'generative grammar = calculus model' is 
plainly false, however, because generative grammars must be able to define 
a f in i te  p rocedure  ( i .e . ,  a p rocedure  rendered  by  a f in i te  
descr ip t ion)  to enumerate  al l  sentences  o f  a language (cf. 
Kratzer / Pause / yon Stechow 1973, 41-50), and are thus algorithmic models par 
excellence14; see also Gross / Lentin 1971, esp. 79 sqq. As a consequence, the 
notion of a calculus model remains notoriously unclear in the study. According 
to what was said under 3. above, calculus models attribute a status to derived 
concepts that is not comparable to their status in the other model types. The 
reader gets no clue about just what a set-theoretical calculus model should look 
like. The author proposes a so-called d e d u c t i v e h i e r a r c h y for model 
types (p. 248-51) saying that relational models d e f in  e universal categories of 
language, algorithmic odels ident i fy  them for any possible language, and 
calculus models s p e c i f y  them for a concrete language. No justification for this 
hierarchy, which I think is hardly understandable on close inspection, is given. I 
see no reason why, say, an algorithmic model should not be capable of all three 
functions named. In fact, this is what the 'principles and parameters' school in 
Generative Grammar claims to be the case (in a short formula: grammar of a 
language L = Universal Grammar + L-specific choice of parameters, the grammar 
of a specific language just being an instantiafion of Universal Grammar). If the 
author thinks that relational models (for which no accurate definition is provided) 
are the most general ones, he is possibly right for different reasons I . van Helden 
connects the types of models with different kinds of 'substance' underlying them 
(p. 196), which, in my eyes, is pure metaphysics, or, even worse, ontology. 
The second component is the b a s e c o m p o n e n t, which contains the 
primitive (i.e., tmderived) elements, relations, and (possibly) axioms of the 
model. It is usually given formally as a system of sets and relations in and 
between these sets. Base components are differentiated according to whether 
they belong to a relational, an algorithmic, or a calculus model; whether they are 
determined e x t e n s i o n a 11 y (i.e., as given for a language or set of languages) 
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or i n t e n s i o n a 11 y (as characterized only by formal conditions on the objects 
in them that hold for all possible languages); and whether reality claims for 
them are specific or empty. Typically, the kind of model studied in the book is 
relational, with specific reality claims and with an intensional base component. 
The third component is the d e v e 1 o p m e n t c o m p o n e n t. It yields the 
derivations or definitions of formal concepts that are not present in the base 
component but can be derived from the sets and relations contained in it. These 
derivations may be c at e g o r i  e s (as, e.g., 'case' or 'gender') or sets of objects 
with certain mathematical properties. The crucial question is how 'interesting' or 
'useful' derivations can be distinguished from trivial or 'useless' ones. van Hetden 
subsumes the answer to this question under the reality claims of the development 
component, proposing to take e m p i r i c a 1 i n t e r e s t as a guiding principle 
for selecting certain derived concepts as relevant o theoretical inspection (p. 
218 sqq.). The empirical interest of a concept is, in turn, evaluated through 
the linguist's in tu i t ion  on some 'empirical reality' and is equated with the 
concept's natura lness  (p. 221). See section 3.2 for critical discussion. - -  
If the base component of a model is viewed as a general theory of (universal 
properties of) language based, not on empirical data of attested languages, but 
on general semiotic, biological, or functional principles, then, according to the 
author, the development component may be seen as an independent, inductively 
obtained and tested, but deductively working counterpart to it (p. 223, 251). 
The fourth component is the stock of 1 a b e 1 s attached to objects of the base 
and development components. Labels can be used in a model without reality 
claims for them - -  in this case, they cannot be compared to the same labels in 
another model. If specific reality claims are made for them, as is usually done in 
set-theoreticai models, then labels specify areas of model-independent empirical 
interest (p. 228-31). Independent of the reality claims put foward, the use of 
labels may be restricted to concrete, individual systems of sets and relations that 
form part of the base or development component of a given model (extensional 
use), or pertain to formal objects as defined model-internally (intensional use) 
(p. 225 sqq.). In most set-theoretical models, 'case', 'part of speech' and the like 
a~e treated as intensional labels with reality claims, whereas, e.g., individual case 
names are treated as extensional labels without reality claims. It is possible to 
constrain the use of a merely extensional label (e.g., 'the phoneme/t/ ' )  to an 
a s s i g n m e n t s p a c e (e.g., certain articutatory p operties to be met by at least 
one variant of/t/). 
The author distinguishes fu l l  mode ls  from par t ia l  and 
subst i tu t iona l  ones. The latter are characterized by ind i rec t  rea l i ty  
c 1 a i m s. Partial models contain formal objects in their b a s e components hat 
are assumed to be d e r i v e d somehow from more primitive objects not provided 
in the partial model. Most set-theoretical models are partial in the sense that they 
352 PETER MEYER 
are thought of as m o d u I e s of an all-encompassing full model. Substitutional 
models contain formal objects that correspond to certain non-linguistic objects 
of examination (e.g., written texts) that in turn correspond regularly to linguistic 
phenomena in reality (e.g., concrete utterances). 
Models might be c 1 a s s i f e  d according to properties of each of the five 
components (p. 242-4). They can be e v a 1 u a t e d according to criteria of econ- 
omy, simplicity, consistency, and adequacy. Of these, economy and simplicity, 
as model-internal criteria, are of limited interest to the author, since they are 
not applicable to the corresponding phenomena of reality; internal consistency 
is a necessary well-formedness condition for all models; adequacy is strongly 
connected with questions of empirical interest. 
In the following parts, the author expounds a large number of set-theoretical 
models, not in a chronological order, but in order of "increasing linguistic 
sophistication" (p. 255). 
2.3.3. Part 2: String Models 
The base component of a set-theoretical model is assumed to specify the set 
of possible languages (p. 215). Therefore, it is natural to classify a model 
according to the re la t iona l  sys tem its base component consists of (i.e., 
the sets, and relations within and between these). In part 2 (p. 256-399) of 
the study the linguistically most naive and technically simplest models of the 
school are presented, the so-called s t r i n g m o d e 1 s. Their base component 
prototypically consists of a relational system tt1: 
~1 = (w, H) 
In this definition, W is an a 1 p h a b e t, that is, a set of basic units. Usually, W 
will be a set of (abstractions of) s o u n d s in models for the concept of word, 
or a set of words  in models for case, gender and the like 16. Note that, in 
the latter case, the base component formalism does not allow for a notion of 
paradigm. Thus, in a string model of, sas; Russian gender, e6poO and e6poOy 
will simply appear s two different words; the intuitive fact that these somehow 
belong together cannot beexpressed in the base component. 
H is a h a r p over W, i.e., a set of linear chains or s t r i n g s of elements of 
W. If W contains the words of a language L, then H typically represents the set 
of 'permissible' or 'grammatical'  strings of words in L - -  in other words, the 
well-formed sentences in L. This raises a question as to the status of the notion 
of grammaticality. A very elucidatory discussion s provided in part 2 (p. 266-75) 
and recurred to at various places in the book. Grammaticality is shown to be a 
highly instable concept. Provisionally, a notion of b r o a d g r a m m a t i c a 1 i t y 
is subscribed to, according to which the semantically deviant phrase On ma~u 
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xu .~ xeny  is accepted as grammatical on account of the structurally parallel 
phrase Ou ma~ ~:u.~ ueOe.~to. This conception has the advantage of avoiding 
having to discuss countless borderline cases. 
W and H being p r i m i t i v e s of the model, there is clearly no point in asking 
where we got these sets. They are simply considered given and used subsequently 
in deriving the 'target concepts' (p. 236) of the model. These derivations usually 
resort o d i s t r i b u t i o n a I i s t cri eria, as will soon be exemplified. 
In chapter 2.1 (p. 276-306) three string models of 'word' are presented and 
discussed, all of which "have not exactly been successful", evidently because 
of their linguistic simplemindedness. An attempt is made, in these models, to 
define 'word' through phonetic phenomena (boundary signals) and distributional 
properties uch as substitutability'. These criteria are bound to fail in view of 
string homonymies (a a moJcamb~ versus aemo~ambt) ,  sandhi phenomena and 
the like. In appendix C (p. 1220-1) a possible formalization of a word definition 
by Revzin is provided in the form of a giant one-page long formula. 
Things get more intriguing in chapter 2.2 (307-371) on word-context  
feature  sys tems,  viz., models in which the words in W (as types, of 
course) are characterized as to their d i s t r i b u t i o n over c o n t e x t s. Roughly, 
a context consists of two strings a, b of words. A word w can be inserted into such 
a context (between the two strings) to yield a string awb. Now awb will either be 
an element of H (that is, a grammatical sentence) or not. For an example, take 
a = on, b = unrnepecuoeo  y~enoeo,  w = y~uOe~. In this case, awb will surely 
be an element of H. If w = .~t06UUtb, then awb will not belong in H. Comparing 
two words w~ and w 2, one could ask 
t. whether there is a context admitting both w I and w2; 
2. whether all and only the contexts admitting wl also admit w2; 
3. whether the set of contexts admitting w~ includes the according set for w2; 
and so on - -  to mention but the most primitive cases. Thus, on p. 317-29, Russian 
nouns are divided into 47 so-called 'families' according to criterion 2 above. 
These families often unite words belonging to different genders, numbers, and 
cases. The author empirically rejects a hypothesis advanced by Revzin, namely, 
that these families directly reflect ('bundles' of) grammatical category features (p. 
329-36). Subsequently, the concept of family is replaced by more sophisticated 
distributional noun classifications that yield a better correspondence to bundles 
of traditional grammatical features 17. Examples are taken from Russian and 
Romanian. All results, however, are far from being satisfactory. 
Chapter2 .3oncontext -word  feature  sys tems (p. 372-99) presents 
the converse approach, classifying contexts according to which words they admit, 
as was the case with the model of section 1.3 above. The models presented here 
prove to be "unexpectedly interesting", as they already deliver the outline of 
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a workable case definition. This is surprising, if one takes into account the 
simplicity of the base component $11. String models have nothing at their disposal 
except linear strings of words. It follows naturally that there is no way of sorting 
out i n t e r f e r i n g f a c t o r s such as gender or part of speech distinctions when 
modelling, e.g., case, because string models are unable to 'localize' these factors 
- -  neither in the (unstructured) contexts nor in the (uncharacterized) words 
inserted in them. 
2.3.4. Part 3: Twin String Models 
Part 3 (p. 400-566) discusses an important amendment of the above-mentioned 
deficiencies of string models. The concept of p a r a d i g m is introduced, which, 
in most cases, is employed in the sense of "unordered set of words which have 
an identical lexical meaning" (p. 40t). Only now it becomes possible to formally 
express uch simple ideas as "all forms of a noun lexeme xhibit he same gender, 
but may of course differ in case". S. Marcus has been the only set-theoretical 
linguist who tried to derive 'paradigm' from a Sit-type base component. This turns 
out to be highly problematic - -  it would be tantamount to deriving semantics 
from some rudimentary information belonging entirely to the expression plane 
of a language (p. 404-10). The only reasonable way is to include the set of 
paradigms P as a primitive into the base component $I2 of twin string models: 
$12 = (W, H, P) 
Several possible constraints on set P are discussed and discarded. Of these, the 
most important one is Kulagina's constraint which demands that no word w 
@ W belong to more than one paradigm. Homonymies as 6epee~ ' I collect' /
'(on the) coast' point to the unfeasibility of this constraint (p. 420-2), which is, 
nevertheless, endorsed through a different interpretation of the sets in $12, taking 
W as the set of abst rac t  word  fo rms 18, which are ordered pairs of a 
lexical meaning 19 and a word form. The abstract word forms ('coast', 6epeeS) 
and ('collect', 6epeeS) each form an example of such a pair. Accordingly, H 
now is a set of strings of such double-sided abstract word forms (hence the 
name of the model type); the elements of P, viz., the paradigms, are now simply 
those etements of W that have a common lexical meaning (= first component). 
Note that Kulagina's constraint now holds trivially. This reinterpretation f $12 is 
necessary to cope with the homonymy problem mentioned above. 
The author investigates syntax-based twin string models of 'part of speech' in 
chapter 3.1 (429-49); these face some serious problems, such as auxiliary words, 
amorphic (uninflected) words, interjections possibly admitted by all contexts, etc. 
Chapter 3.2 (p. 450-535) presents twin string models for 'gender'. Not 
surprisingly, these models are formally closely related to part-of-speech models 
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- -  both model types deal with invariant properties of 1 e x e m e s. The author 
presents a demanding in-depth discussion of as many as 18 different gender model 
varieties, which at times 6xhibit considerable t chnical complexity; the chapter 
closes with an excellent comparative overview (p. 531-3). Several phenomena 
observed in Slavic languages, in particular the animacy distinction, the pluralia 
and singutaria tantum, and fuzzy gender assignment 2° present great difficulties, 
and are thoroughly investigated. As a core problem, certain contexts construable 
from H must often be excluded from the analysis, as interfering factors produced 
by them would spoil the results. However, selection of appropriate contexts in 
order to obtain intuitively satisfactory outputs produces an undesirable sort of 
implicit circularity; see section 3.1 for more. 
The existing twin string case models 21 (chapter 3.3, 536-66) turn out to 
parallel very much the string case models based on $11, the paradigm concept 
being added as an auxiliary device rather than as an integral part of the model that 
is exploited in full (p. 536). Again, modelling case in terms of word distribution 
in linear, syntactically unstructured contexts is hardly satisfactory due to the 
narrow conceptual boundaries of the base component fI2: "Contexts uffer from 
an inherent lack of precision. Of the words that make up a context, only one 
or two usually affect he case forms of the admitted word: the other words just 
clutter the picture." (p. 562). 
2.3.5. Part 4: Dependency Models 
In the fourth, longest and most demanding, part of the study (p. 567-1023), a
possible solution to the problems just hinted at is developed in all of its possible 
ramifications, namely, replacing simple-minded linear contexts by dependency 
structures with a gap2L Chapter 4.0 (p. 567-78) introduces the reader to the 
mathematical properties of dependency structures, paying special heed to different 
conceptions of projectivity. All set-theoretical dependency models presented in
part 4 do not use labelling of the branches or nodes in dependency trees, which 
simplifies the formal treatment considerably. As in the preceding part, the author 
first discusses the possibility that the newly introduced base component concept 
might be derivable from simpler ones. 
Chapter 4.1 (p. 579-683) deals with conf igurat ion  ana lys i s ,  
a quite successless attempt to derive dependency-like structures called 
subord inat ion  s t ructures  from simple Itt-type base components. The 
starting point of the analysis is the idea that certain chains of words have the 
same distribution as single words. These chains are called c o n f ig  u r a t i o n s ; 
subsequently, this notion is extended to cover less obvious cases. A formal 
procedure called conf igurat ion  reduct ion  produces some sort of im- 
mediate constituent structure for the sentences in H; furthermore, for each 
356 PETER MEYER 
constituent i s h e a d is derived by yet another procedure in order to derive 
dependency structures from immediate constituent s ructures. But in this analysis, 
'exocentric' phrases like na Ou6ane already constitute a serious problem since 
they show a distribution ot compatible with their components, in this case, na 
and Oueane. The author systematically confronts configuration analysis with t e 
methodological criticism found in Padu~eva (1965). According to both authors, 
the essential f aw of configuration analysis is the confusion of tokens and types 
(p. 617). 
Of the attempts to derive dependency structure directly, without configurations 
as an intermediate concept, Nebesk~'s i the most attractive one, taking It 3, 
$13 = (W, H,/) ,  
as base component, where W and H are as in ~I 1, I being a highly problematic 
s e m a n t i c i n c 1 u s i o n relation between elements of H. This approach runs 
into several difficulties, e.g., coordination and non-projective sentences, for 
which some possible extensions are discussed, viz. surface transformations and 
the assumption of abstract non-surface lements. However, "no satisfactory 
dependency structure can be derived from more primitive concepts that are 
contained in the base components used in Part 2 and Part 3" (p. 683). 
Most models include dependency structure as a primitive notion into their base 
components, which are the subject of chapter 4.2 (p. 684-724). The prototypical 
base component 23 of dependency-based models is 
$14 = (W, H, P, D) 
Here, W, H, and P are the same as in I;I2; D contains, for each sentence h E 
H, the set D(h) of ordered pairs ((w t, n~), (w e, n2)), where w 1 and w 2 are words 
in h with the position numbers n l and n 2, respectively, and w 2 is immediately 
dependent on w r No model discussed in the study uses all information contained 
in I;I4, simplifying it along one or more of the following lines: 
• Linear order is not taken into consideration; 
• only poss ib le  dependency  paths  or three- or two-element frag- 
ments of such paths are investigated; 
• only the possible h igh  or low ne ighbours  of words are considered. 
Four models make an effort to derive the notion of paradigm from a sim- 
pler dependency base component (chapter 4.3, p. 725-759), using a suspicious 
semantics-based notion of p r o t o - p a r a d i g m that already appeared in part 3 
of the study. Questions like Do e6poO and eopo06 belong to the same lexeme? 
are really not very likely to be answered in a mechanical way, though. The 
chapter contains a very interesting discussion of possessive adjectives in Slavic 
languages. 
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Dependency models of 'part of speech', mostly just refined versions of certain 
string models, are explored in chapter 4.4 (p. 760-834). Though the results seem 
to offer more prospects than with string models, still several problems remain. In 
general, the output will be only as good as the researcher's intuition that led to the 
assumed ependency structures in the base component (p. 831-2). The general 
assumption, made in these models, of a one-to-one correspondence between 
word tokens and tokens of lexical meaning conflicts, e.g., with portmanteau nd 
'semantically empty' elements and the like. van Helden brings in an interesting 
alternative proposal of his own and doesn't even forget o criticize it thoroughly 
(p. 813-33). 
Chapter 4.5 (p. 835-93) presents two elaborated dependency-based models of 
case, one of which, namely Gladkij's, is usually "considered the apex of case 
modelling" according to van Hetden (p. 849). But, of course, several problems 
remain unsolved ven here: The base component of Gladkij's model includes 
only the set of dependency pairs, telling us which words may depend immediately 
on a given word in at least one sentence in H; for any case, Gladkij's definition 
prescribes that there be a lexical item on which nouns of this and only this 
case depend immediately; a seemingly simple case as the Russian nominative 
is, however, probably not in line with this requirement (p. 858 sqq.) - -  unless 
we subscribe to a very narrow view on grammaticality, which causes trouble 
elsewhere in yielding unwanted extra cases. A similar situation is found with 
gender dependency models (chapter 4,6, p. 894-994); of the two models discussed, 
again Gladkij's is the more interesting one, being the technically most intricate 
model of the Set-theoretical School. It takes van Helden as many as 37 pages 
to introduce it. The model's performance is somewhat impressive, providing 
intensional definitions of both gender and agreement class 24. Still it fails to assign 
token  gender  correctly in all instances: It would not be able to tell us that 
cupoma, which is gender-ambiguous in isolation, is not so in ut~a cupoma (p. 
959). 
Chapter 4.7 (p. 995-1023) contains asummary of the foregoing and considers a 
number of possible modifications f the dependency framework, such as labelling 
dependency branches, inserting abstract nodes into dependency structures, or 
using a certain dependency format operating with the notion of valency. 
2.3.6. Part 5: Semantic Frame Models of 'Case' 
In several respects part 5 (p. 1024-1175) is the culmination of the linguistic 
discussion in the study. The three models discussed there have been developed by 
RS. Kuznecov, V.A. Uspenskij, and Kolmogorov, respectively; modifications were 
proposed by Zaliznjak and Marcus. All models include explicitly s e m ant i  c 
items in their base component, which, prototypically, looks as follows: 
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$15 = (W, K, 'P',  'Q', M) 
Here, W is the set of words (as in $11!), K is the set of (linear) contexts, the 
precise interpretation f which may vary between models (one could have taken 
contexts to be derived entities, of course, introducing, say, a set H of phrases 
instead); 'P'  is the set of (semantic) ob jec ts ,  roughly some kind of abstract 
meaning of the noun lexemes in the language. "In practice, 'P' corresponds to 
the set of paradigms" as introduced above in section 2.3.4 (cf. p. 1026). The 
elements of 'Q', henceforth called s t a t e s in this article, are a kind of semantic 
correlate to contexts; the exact interpretation varies considerably between models. 
In KoImogorov's model, which I will outline briefly below, states (also named 
semant ic  f rames  by van Helden) can be thought of as "states of affairs in 
the real world" (p. 1027) an object might possibly find itself in at a certain point 
of time. Thus, a state 'I read Z' (that is, the state of being read by the speaker) 
can be the semantic orrelate to a context Y ~tumato ..... ; problems tart when 
we wonder whether this state would also correspond to the context ~ ~umato 
uurnepecnyJo ..... 25. The answers to questions as these are model-dependent, 
the problem being that no independent representation (or rigorous definition) of 
states is available. Finally, M is a relation between W, K, 'P' and 'Q' telling us 
for each w E W, k E K, 'p' ~ 'P' ,  'q' E 'Q' whether the following statement is
true: "Word w can indicate object 'p '  and can be used in context k to express the 
fact that 'p '  finds itself in state 'q'." (p. 1028) 
Suspiciously, only case models have been produced in the semantic frame 
paradigm. Of these, the author rates Kolmogorov's to show the best overall 
performance and, in spite of its being technically simple and among the oldest 
models of the school, the "linguistic end point" (p. 1142) of the Set-theoretical 
School. In this model cases are, basically, "sets of states which admit the same 
word forms" (p. 1124); here, word forms are ordered pairs (w, 'p') with w E W, 
'p' E ,p,26; a word form (w, 'p') is admitted by a state 'q' if and only if there is 
a context k such that (w, k, 'p' ,  'q') is an element of relation M. The definition 
can easily be refined to deal with some more or less technical difficulties, which, 
however, inhibited the model from finding a wider audience (p. 1125-6). Let 
us look at one example. The states 'There is )~' and 'Z helped me' obviously 
admit the same word forms in Russian, viz., in traditional terms, they prompt 
the nominative of each lexeme in the contexts corresponding to them (Ecmb 
..... and ..... no .~oeaet / -a / -o / -u  ~e) .  Thus, these two states belong to one 
Kolmogorov-type case. As the reader will have noticed, it is an advantage of 
these models that they have no difficulties with, e.g., gender interference, since 
formal changes in contexts have, per  definitionem, no impact on case constitution. 
Discussion of semantic frame models and their inherent methodological 
problems is found below, see section 3. 
GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES AND THE METHODOLOGY OF LINGUISTICS 359 
2.3.7. Part 6: The Legacy oft,he Set-theoretical School 
In part 6 (p. 1176-1200), the huge output of the Kulagina School is synoptically 
assessed along several parameters: The role of Soviet science policy, internal 
personal structure of the school, historiography of linguistics, methodology, 
aspects of formalization, contribution to linguistics and mathematics. This short 
review is rather modest, with a plea for an overall semantic approach instead of 
the s y n t a c t i c i s m that prevailed in almost all set-theoretical work. According 
to the author, the development of an explicit "non-linguistic" metalanguage for 
statements on language is "methodologically prior" to developing a formal 
description of a particular linguistic phenomenon (p~ 1190). I agree that the 
efforts made to this end constitute the most remarkable achievement of the 
Kulagina School, which did not set out to invent a new linguistics, but tried 
instead to find out what linguistics is talking about. 
3. SEMANTICS 1N SET-THEORETICAL MODELS: DISCUSSION 
In parts 5 and 6 of his study, the author discusses the role of semantics in 
set-theoretical models. It is this aspect of his study the author himself deems to 
be the most important one. By way of synopsis, I shall present and discuss the 
different options considered in the book and the major conclusions drawn by van 
Helden. 
3.1. Models without Semantics 
Most of the models found in parts 2 to 4 of the monograph do not include any 
semantically interpretable notions in their respective base components (91 - -  $I4), 
save occasional exceptions where (usually doubtful) semantic auxiliary concepts 
are introduced to solve specific problems. In the very end, the author rejects the 
methodological s y n t a c t i c i s m inherent in these models (p. 1192 sqq.) despite 
their sometimes impressing performance, arguing (esp. in chapter 4.6, cf. 96t 
sqq.) that certain complex phenomena can only be accounted for in a primarily 
semantic approach. As close inspection shows, however, van Helden's arguments 
are not conclusive. They do not prove that the models are inconsistent or yield 
the wrong results but only demonstrate hat, in certain cases, the obtained results 
do not exhaust he matter. E.g., no 'syntacticist' model will tell us why in the 
sentence noey~o uautY:z (uttered on presenting a book - -  cf. p. 962) the feminine 
forrn uo6yu) is used. But, if uo6yto is treated as an adjective, this question clearly 
is beyond the intended scope of models of g e n d e r o f n o u n s. If Ho6y~o 
is considered a noun, again no problem arises: Gender models generally don't 
tell us why, in a certain communicative context, we use one noun (e.g., uoeast) 
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and not another one (say, rtoeoe). 27 Syntacticist models might be incomplete in 
that they leave questions open that can only be answered on semantic grounds, 
but no proof is available that they cannot model the whole range of phenomena 
w i th in  the scope  o f  the i r  respect ive  de f in i t ions .  
I believe that more fundamental objections against syntacticist models than 
those advanced by van Helden seem to be conceivable. Even if a non-semantic 
model (with a base component with specific reality claims) handles all data of 
a specific language 'correctly', there will be, to my conviction, no possibility to 
guarantee the same, as oon as the model is applied to another language. Even 
the most sophisticated non-semantic case models to be found in the study will 
obviously meet with complete  fa i lu re  when applied to other than, e.g., 
Romance or Slavic languages. Take Kwakwala (Wakashan), which has become 
famous among morphologists for cliticizing case and efiniteness morphemes on 
the (phonological) word p r e c e d i n g the respective noun (Boas 1969, 528-30). 
None of the models in parts 2-4 could handle this phenomenon. If anything, only 
a considerable r interpretation f the base component elements and the use of 
several auxiliary concepts could save the approach. Note that the very concept of 
linear context will have to depend on the language described. 
Most case models discussed by van Helden have problems with 'filtering' 
gender inference in, say, Russian. But even if a model has been amended so as to 
surmount this difficulty, it will, again, produce utter nonsense when confronted, 
with, e.g., Modem Irish. Taking Irish nouns that are attributes to other nouns in 
a 'possessive construction' as an example, we may state that their morphological 
form may depend on the following parameters (cf. (3 Siadhail 1980, passim, 
for the Cois Fhairrge (Connacht) dialect; Christian Brothers 1991, 15-6, 28-32 
for Standard Irish): definiteness and referential properties of the nomen rectum; 
the word immediately preceding it; case, number, gender, (deep-)phonological 28 
and word class properties of the nomen regens. Actually, things are even more 
intricate due to interfering semantic and syntactic factors. I presume a model 
that encompasses, or rather foresees, all possible horrors of morphosyntax is not 
possible, unless it is as general, and, eo ipso, trivial as the one proposed in 1.3, 
which has the inestimable virtue of leaving all categorial unravelling to 'some 
other module'. 
Tentatively, I would like to advance the following principle: Successful 
set-theoretical modelling of any morphological category M in a language L
presupposes exhausting knowledge of all other grammatical categories in L. 
Note that this principle was adopted above in 1.3 in interpreting the linguistic 
content of F. Such knowledge will, e.g. in highly fusional morphological systems, 
indirectly require that the investigator already know a good deal about M and 
its morphological expression. Yet, this kind of circularity is not a deathblow to 
set-theoretical models. It is cJosely connected with another, epistemic ircularity: 
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Applying a model with specific reality claims to a language, it can occur to 
the investigator that the results are, from a linguistic point of view, devoid of 
what van Helden calls e / -np i r i ca l  in teres t  (p. 218-21). In this case the 
investigator has at least wo options. He may alter the empirical correlates of base 
component notions (using, e.g., refined dependency structures); or he may try to 
find a better derivation for the target concept. In choosing the former possibility, 
he shows us that his intuitive expectations will condition his interpretation f the 
base component elements, and, eventually, the results he obtains (p. 83 t-2); in 
choosing the latter, the evaluation criterion for derivations i  empirical interest, 
which the author equates to natura lness  or meta l ingu is t i c  in tu i t ion  
as a characterization f pertinent psychological states of a linguist (p. 218-21). 
In either case, intuition shapes the model in order to yield intuitively right 
results. Again, contrary to what the author seems to believe, this epistemic 
circularity does not endanger the set-theoretical project, at least if we subscribe 
to a strictly relational interpretation of the models, where different concepts are 
linked by a network of mathematical constraints and are thus determined -modo 
structuralistico- nly by their respective positions in a s y s t e m. Van Helden 
slips into the algorithmic paradigm when he speaks of categories "we get out 
of the model" when we "feed" it in a certain way (p. 832)° There is obviously 
no way to get rid of epistemic ircularity, which may even be argued to be 
present in any scientific model (for physics, cf. Weizs~icker 1988). To my mind, 
we can even make a virtue of necessity by re-interpreting set-theoretical models 
as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s : No putative grammatical (or morphological) 
category C of a language L may be called case u n 1 e s s C can be shown to 
be expressible in terms of set-theoretical formalism XYZ. Another option of 
interpreting set-theoretical models will be hinted at in section 3.4. 
3.2. Models Employing Mainly External Semantics 
The models discussed in part 5, among them Kolmogorov's, use s t a te  s as 
unanalyzed semantic primitives. Van Helden investigates the option of further 
dissecting states into more elementary 'meaning factors' relevant to the case (or, 
more generally, word form) of words admitted by these states. A meaning factor 
contained in a state 'q' is said to be in terna l  if it cannot be correlated with 
any fo rmal  properties of a context k corresponding to 'q', but only with the 
forms of words admitted by the state; otherwise it is externa l  (p. 1142-4). 
Thus, if a context k completely determines, by virtue of its formal properties, 
the case of words admitted by it, we must assume that the corresponding state 
'q' contains only external meaning. This last thought, incidentally, shows that all 
non-semantic models (as discussed in parts 2-4 of the study) happen to operate, 
if indirectly, on external meaning! In general, the internal vs. external distinction 
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is not an absolute one, but hinges upon the linguistic model within which the 
notion of 'context' is determined. Thus, if one takes contexts to be linear strings 
"with a gap", the context 
/~a/o  . . . . .  
will admit word forms of at least three (traditional) cases, the choice between 
wtfich is ascribed to internal meaning. If contexts are given as dependency 
structures formally distinguishing different valencies of a given verb (cf. p. 1013- 
5), then the above linear context will correspond to at least hree dependency 
contexts admitting only forms of one case, respectively. This way, we can 
eliminate internal meaning by small steps by turning it into the external meaning 
of refinedly described contexts. Again, intuition won't help: Though it seems 
natural to think (as van Helden does, p. 1144) that the choice between genitive 
and accusative in 
~/He mo6.~to ..... 
is governed by internal meaning, Pesetsky (1982, 147 sqq.) assumes two widely 
differing syntactic descriptions of the context. - -  In the following I will assume 
the matter to be settled somehow. 
The author rejects models founded on external meaning for two reasons (p. 
1172). His criticism concerns primarily 'state models' such as Kolmogorov's, 
since states contain external meaning, if amalgamated with internal meaning. To 
my mind, his counterarguments areinconclusive. 
First, van Helden claims that state models produce intuitively undesirable 
cases. Thus, in a variety of Russian, the context 
TpyOHo xoOumb no ..... 
admits the (traditional) "dative for most nominals but the locative for pronouns 
of the third person and for interrogative pronouns" (p. t092). This uffices for 
a new 'po-case' to come into being in, say, Kolmogorov's model 29. Intuition is 
given as the major reason to reject his descriptive solution (p. 1114), which is the 
author's common practice in assessing set-theoretical models. But perhaps we 
should say that it is a task of linguistics to find out just w h y a certain solution 
appears counterintuitive. In the po-case, the problem may be called 'want of 
generalization'. Assuming a po-case obscures the simple fact that po governs the 
dative in certain contexts save with a clearcut closed class of words. A solution 
seems to be more appropriate where a 1 o c a 1 r u 1 e handles the few exceptions, 
interacting with a global rule of dative assignment after po. But, of course, no 
notion of 'rule' is available in set-theoretical models. Alternatively, we might say 
that it is preferable n o t t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t the few exceptional words, 
by, e.g., assigning them to a different word class than nouns. But the problem of 
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which other data must be taken i to account in describing a concrete phenomenon 
is not specific to state models; instead, I propose to view it as one of the most 
fundamental questions of linguistics at all. To take a familiar example: Must we, 
in describing the syntax of passive clauses, take into account the 'corresponding' 
active clauses (as early generativists firmly believed) or not (as many of today's 
Chomskianists would argue)? 
Indeed, it is exactly this general methodological problem to which van 
Helden's second objection against state models can be r duced, viz. that they 
cannot distinguish between case homonymy and syncretism. The author holds it 
to be plausible that in 
(1) On n~a~aem 6 :,tope 
the word ~uope is ambiguous between an accusative and a locative reading due to 
an accidental coincidence on the expression plane (p. 1138)o In contrast to this, 
om~a in 
(2) YI ue 6u~cy omt~a 
is supposed to be an instance of case syncretism: With all animate nouns and 
their modifiers, the choice between accusative and genitive in direct objects of 
negated verbs, a choice usually assumed to have semantic import, is completely 
neutralized on the expression plane, van Helden reports that native speakers 
feel no ambiguity here, which proves nothing in itself, given the possibility, 
often mentioned in the study, to condition informants accordingly. The author 
declares the homonymy vs. syncretism dichotomy a crucial one; now, linguistic 
dichotomies are good at disappearing once closely looked at. This particular 
one can easily be subsumed under the general question of linguistic description 
formulated above. To account for the homonymy of (1), it would suffice, for 
some 3° grammarians, to take into account some 'close relatives' of (t), viz, 
sentences where ~uope is modified by an attributive adjective. Things aren't hat 
easy with (2). If we want (2) to be homonymous we must presuppose that, 
e.g., 5/ ne eu~cy xt~uey /xuueu are relatives not too distant from (2) to be 
taken into account and be treated analogously. Such a presupposition is based 
on the linguistic world view chosen, rather than on a priori considerations on 
human language. Note that linguists are even free to refuse a 11 consideration 
of the behaviour of other nouns when determining cases of a nominal texeme. 
In this instance, we get lexically determined case systems with cases valid fbr 
one particular noun only. Interestingly, the author discusses this option at _great 
length, despite of its admitted clash with tradition (p. 1135 sqq., 1156 sqq.). 
Thus, on the one hand, some alleged flaws of state models may turn out to be 
thorny for any linguistic model. On the other hand, more defects are lurking in the 
morphosyntactic dark, possibly more fundamental ones..First, state models forget 
364 PETERMEYER 
about the virtues the author ascribes to them as soon as we leave the realm of 
Slavic and Romanic. Kolmogorov's model copes well with gender interference 
in Russian, but is really helpless in Irish, where 'genitive' noun word forms 
sometimes depend on the gender of the preceding noun. In Standard Irish, the 
states 'It happened on a day of Z' and 'It happened on a night of)~' would belong 
to different state model cases, as ofche 'night' (but not ld 'day') is a feminine 
noun, causing the following word to undergo mutation of the initial consonant. 
Perhaps the model could be amended in order to cover the relevant data correctly, 
but it is improbable that any model could capture all complications possible in 
human language mechanically. 
Further, external meaning in states have a doubtful conceptual status. If a 
meaning factor is external, it is, as said above, correlated to some formal property 
of a context. Why, then, don't we just talk about contexts instead of states? 3~ 
Welt, if every formal difference in context corresponded to a difference in 
state, a Kolmogorov-type model would, mathematically, become identical to a 
linear string model. As the discussion of states in the study shows, they are a 
valuable instrument simply because they are assumed to represent semantically 
the factors that  a re  re levant  fo r  cho ice  of  case .  Two questions 
arise: If prepositions or verbs govern a certain case, do we n e e d semantic 
states to account for this? And, what is worse, do we need the states we posited 
to model case for anything else than modelling case? The second question 
hints at a deep-rooted circularity that jeopardizes Kolmogorov's enterprise, since 
even if we accept, as I did above (section 3.1), that we get cases according 
to our intentions and intuitions as reflected in the base component (in this 
instance, in the states), we can't possibly admit a situation where a primitive 
of the model has no independent justification apart f om helping us model our 
target concept. Paradigms or dependency structures in non-semantic models are 
obviously relevant for other problems besides case modelling; as far as I can see, 
this is not true for states. 
3.3. Models Employing Internal Semantics 
The last resort, then, is internal meaning: meaning factors that correspond to 
formal properties, not of the context, but of the word inserted into it. As 
appendix B of the study (p. 1207-1219), an earlier article by van Helden (1979) 
is reproduced in which an internal semantics approach is formally worked out 
to a certain extent. In the article, a set of semantic atoms is considered given, 
together with relations between them; any linguistic sign is assumed to be a 
linear phoneme string paired with a semantic onfiguration, i.e., a set of semantic 
atoms with relations between them. The paper is extremely thought-provoking, 
containing attempts of defining linguistic signs, words, inflection classes etc., but 
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is somewhat flawed by a particularly high number of errors (see appendix); it 
contains everal debatable assumptions 32,most of which could perhaps be dropped 
in a more sophisticated version the author promises for future publication. In 
the paper, an effort is made to define the notion of g rammat ica l  ca tegory  
purely in terms of internal meaning. Roughly, the semantic onfigurations that 
are the members of a grammatical category must form a set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives in the more complex configuration they form a part of. This idea is 
programmatically developed and refined in part 5 (p. 1 i51 sqq.), where special 
attention is drawn to semantic feature systems of case (modo Jakobson) and 
lexically determined internal case systems. The mode of exposition in this central 
section of the book is unbearably inexplicit, sometimes even cryptic; thus, I found 
myself unable to find a coherent understanding of the crucial characterization 
of 'internal grammatical category' (p. 1151, lines 12-7 from bottom) 33 that is 
compatible with the remarks on establishing invariant meaning on p. 1160-1, the 
1979 paper, and a host of remarks on other pages 34. Apart from detail questions, 
the following problems arise. 
First, if a definition of case or grammatical category is based on internal 
meaning alone, we may wonder whether any connection to expression plane phe- 
nomena remains. Indeed, the author assumes precisely no connection whatsoever 
in his 1979 paper. Things are seemingly different in the main text of the study. 
On p. 1156, fig. 5.66.1 shows texically determined case systems based on internal 
meaning for three lexical items, where the internal case inventory of each noun is 
in one-to-one correspondence with the word forms distinguished by the lexeme. 
Only three pages later, deviations from this simple scheme, such as instances 
of °case syncretism', are acknowledged to remain problematic. But why should 
differences in word form be paralleled so neatly by semantic differences? van 
Helden assumes more or less explicitly 35 that a kind of invafiant abstract meaning 
common to each feature of a grammatical category (sc. found in traditional 
grammar!) can be found unless the meaning is 'neutralized' by purely external 
conditions actualizing that feature mechanically in a certain grammatical context 
(cf. p. 1196-7). 
This is not the place to discuss the old question of justifying invafiant 
underlying meanings of grammatical categories. Let me mention a potential 
counterargument that is particularly pertinent to the set-theoretical pproach. 
Imagine you just managed to assign a single abstract meaning to what you 
believe to be, say, a certain case in the investigated language, a single meaning 
that accounts for all non-externally conditioned occurences of this case found so 
far. As soon as you find a single counterexample to the alleged common abstract 
meaning you are urged to find a new, even more abstract meaning subsuming 
the new data. As a consequence, your theory of the abstract case meaning is 
d e s c r i p t i v e 1 y i n s t a b 1 e as a s ing le  add i t iona l  datum might  p rompt  a 
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major theory revision. This descriptive instability is typical of set-theoretical 
models: In many case models, a single noun with strange behaviour can produce 
new cases. Note that the model proposed in 1.3 above avoids this kind of 
instability: Local irregularities can be filtered out by a fitted adaptation of 
function F. This trick does not really solve our problems, of course; instead, it 
suggests that a solution must be sought o u t s i d e the formalism, perhaps in a 
semiotic approach. 
Even in an internal meaning approach to grammatical categories, external 
meaning must be taken care of. If there were, in a language L, a noun two 
different word forms of which are always conditioned exclusively by (different) 
external conditions 36, this noun alone would force us to reject he internal meaning 
approach (cf. p. 1152-4). Some old friends, such as the po-case discussed above, 
turn up again. A po-case in Russian is avoidable in an internal meaning approach 
to case only if we assume that case after po is conditioned by external meaning. 
I do not believe that this captures the reason why we, intuitively, would rather 
like to abstain from a po-case. But if we accept he word forms after 'local' po 
as conditioned externally, then it is unclear to which of the internally defined 
cases they belong. A procedure of ext rapo la t ion  will have to be called for 
to assign the "relevant grammemes" here (cf. p. 1152); but I doubt whether this 
can be achieved in a non-arbitrary way. 
Inspired by some ideas of Mel'~uk, van Helden proceeds to present what is 
announced as the principal result of his study at the very outset (p. ix): After the 
extension of language-specific grammatical categories has been established on 
grounds of internal meaning, s p e c i f i  c grammatical categories (such as case, 
gender etc.) of a language can be identified only in reliance on external meaning. 
Thus, van Helden proposes that a category can possibly be assigned the label 
c a s e, if it may be used to "mark the second place in a valency relation" (p. 
1173), whereas the formal means of a gender category are never used to this 
end. As a result, so-called assignment spaces for category labels can be given by 
referring to conditions of external meaning. 
Again, there are objections, the discussion of which would require a separate 
article. But, naturally, the notion of valency is crucial here. Imagine a language 
where nomina recta in the genitive case mark the gender of the nomen regens, 
which is a common phenomenon (cf. Mel'~uk 1993). If the governing noun 
is an inherently relational noun, that is, if it is "inalienably possessed", nouns 
dependent on it will get in the second place of an obligatory valency relation, 
and therefore, the gender marking of the nomen regens found on them will mark 
exactly this second position. It is implausible to assume a reinterpretation f
gender as case here. Generally speaking, there are possibly differences between 
case and gender that are more fundamental to grammatical modelling but not 
expressible in van Helden's framework: Case seems to be a feature of n o u n s 
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as t o k e n noun p h r a s e s, whereas gender is likely to come out as a feature 
of n o u n s as 1 e x e m e s. Note, incidentally, that it is not impossible to model 
such a characterization in set-theoretical terms; but it would urge us to extend 
our analysis beyond the level of single words. 
It is even conceivable that the enterprise of finding an assignment space for the 
labels 'case' or 'gender' will turn out to be of minor importance. A description of 
a grammatical category in a language might be a good description even without 
providing a label for the category described. It is quite possible that the common 
properties of what we are inclined to call case in different languages happen to 
fall out of the scope of a formatizable description of grammar, because they can 
be accounted for only on a more fundamental, say semiotic or cognitive, level. 
3.4. Conclusion 
t can only mention some other aspects hat deserve careful discussion. A 
full-fledged set-theoretical ccount of categorial phenomena would have to 
embrace language change as a part of its descriptive power. For the time being, 
diachronic hanges remain a mystery for set-theoretical models, especially for 
models employing semantic notions, because they potentially affect different, 
semantic and non-semantic primitives of the base component at the same time; 
these different changes in the base component (e.g., in states and paradigms), 
however, are interrelated, without hese interrelations themselves being amenable 
to set-theoretical modelling. 
Idioms are a case in point. Being the result of diachronic petrification, 
expressions like "kick the bucket" possibly resist any semantic analysis, which 
jeopardizes semantics-based set-theoretical approaches that would have to give a 
semantic interpretation to 'bucket' in order to assess its case. In fixed expressions, 
extinct morphology might be conserved - -  which lets us hasten to try excluding 
them by way of operational principles from our analysis. 
Embracing Chomsky's opinion that discovery procedures are not possible 
(cf. 1957, 56), I suggest hat a much weaker interpretation of set-theoretical 
formalization ismore feasible. Briefly, we can imagine to look at a set of possible 
descriptions of a certain language. Our set-theoretical procedures, then, might urn 
out to be statements on possible transformations of descriptions into other 
descriptions, some of which can be assessed as being more natural, predictive, 
or economicalthanothers on ly  by descr ip t ion -externa l  c r i te r ia .  
This view, though unspectacular, still does not turn set-theoretical models into 
trivia; only by a principled discussion of semiotic and communicative properties 
of human language can it be justified. 
My lengthy remarks are not meant o spoil the overall picture of van Helden's 
study. Rather, they show that it is an excellent and thought-provoking stimulus 
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for further research work, which I believe is about the best praise a scientific 
publication can be given. The methodological, empirical, and historiographic 
scrutiny of this giant work as well as the vastness of fresh and original ideas 
and observations contained in about 1300 demanding pages, often enough hidden 
in footnotes, secure it the status of the only reference work on set-theoretical 
modelling for a long time. 
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Appendix: Errata 
The following is a comprehensive list of  all formal and mathematical  errors and 
mispr ints I have found; some other mistakes have also been given i f  they obscure 
understanding of the text considerably. The left co lumn shows what is found in 
the book, the right gives a conjectural amendment .  
293, (2.1.9.1) 
.o .  ^ V ¢oi_1=c 9 . . . .  
l<~j'<m 
, . ,  v A COl+ l=a j  . . . .  
l<j~Nm 
• . .4 )b}  
(There are further flaws in the formula. 
Index i can get out of range; constraints 
of the type ft f2 =coi are missing.) 
299, (2.1.13.3) 
(D-congruence does not define a parti- 
tion of H*, because it is not a transitive 
relation.) 
30I, (2.1.13.6) 
. . .  (hi ,  b ,  b2)EB(h  ) .  . . 
350, (2.2.19.8) 
(The formula does not yield the desired 
results. To see this, assume (within the 
example discussed on the page) w = 
w 1 = to,  w z = krasnoe .  Union sets of 
different families can never be families 
again!) 
/ 
. . .  A~ V e)i_~=c 9 . . . .  
\ I <=j' < m 
. . .  v V ~i+~=aj  . . . . . .  
l~j"<=m 
. . .4 ) )  b} 
(Formula must be changed significantly: 
B(h)  (which is a misprint for BS(h) )  is a set 
of pairs (cf. (2.1.13.4)), not triples.) 
Wq/= 
(w lweW ^ A (K (w l )  u. . .  u 
(w~,...,~,,, } c W 
K(w, )=K(w)  ~ V F (w i )=F(w) )  } 
l~ i<n 
Note: The same mistake occurs in all definit ions of quasi- init ial elements in the 
study, i.e., in (2.3.6.1), (2.3.9.t l ) ,  (2.3.11.20), (3.3.12.5), (4.5.9.5), (4.5.I6.t),  
(4.6.22.8), (5.13.7), (5.42.1). 
350 
F(krasnoe)  --, F(~to) krdsnoe  - ,  ~to 
367, (2.2.27.2) 
. . .  ( i , j )  = kn(w)  . . . ( i , j )  = k" (h i ,  h2) 
423, 1.3 
. . .  H'  is a harp on W: . . . . . .  H'  is a harp on W' : . . .  
426, 1.4 
. . .  by P' . .. by ps. . .  
476, (3.2.12.4) 
. . .  A . . . . . .  A . . .  
l~-k<~m l<kNm 
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486, (3.2.16.3) 
The formula contains no less than six 
errors and must be rewritten as follows: 
506, (3.2.24•2) 
The formula does not capture all in- 
tended cases, as the nouns w~, w2 are 
assumed not to be defective at the same 
time here. An improved version is 
obtained as follows: 
528, last line 




• ••  A . . .  
l~k~j  
6 9 = 
(O lOCW^ A A A A V 
w,~G wz~O w~P(wt)  w~@P(v~) G:EG ~ 
(w~EG~ A w~Ot)  A 
A V V V ~, 
w3q~G w, EG wiSP(w3)  w~,Ee(w4) G]@G 4 
(w~G:  ' 4 v w4~Gj)) 
Delete '(' before 2nd, add '(' before 3rd 
quamor; delete 6th quantor; change all 'C2' 
to 'C 1'; make corresponding changes in 3rd 
and 4th line of formula. 
. . .  G l6 (medtd) . . .  
(4.1.17.6) 
• . .  A . , .  
1 ~k ~<j 
k ~p(h') 
Note: Same flaw in (4,1 •36.2). 
621, (4.1.25.1) 
. . .  n'  <- p (h )vw = w(n ,  h ) .  . . . . .  n'  ~ p (h)^ w = w(n ,  h ) .  
Note: Same mistake in (4.1.29.3), (4.1.36.7)! 
644, (4.1.36.3) 
w(o)) is an undefined function; as far as 
I can see, w is superfluous. 
645, line 19 
After this line, the following must be 
inserted: 
687, 1.5 from bottom 
•..  power set' H*(h)  of the free monoid 2
H*(  h ) . . . 
688, line 6 





. . .  (B i (d l )  :3 (Bi(d2) ~ 0 . . .  
691, (4.2.4.2) 
. . .DED. . .  
691, (4.2.4.3) 
. . •K  CD* . . .  
Replace all w(o).. .  ) by o). 
co c f~(h ) 
Then D6-dependency is defined as follows:' 
. .. power set I H*(f~(h)) of the free monoid 2
H*(n(h) ) .  . .  
Set Hi(d)  which contains the initial sub- 
strings... [2 mistakes!] 
...~fl'=d} 
• . . (B i (d l )  f3 Bi(dz) ~ 0 . . .  
. . .  D C H*(W). . .  
. . .KC  {DID C f~*} . . .  
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691, (4.2.4.3) 
. . .  V . . .  
D6D"  
702, (4.2.7.4) 
K* is undefined. Replace k ~ K* by: 
735, (4.3.5.8) 





. . .  w~DA(w~) 
742, (4.3.12.1) 
The following condition must be added 
before '}' to avoid an infinite set: 
. . .  V , . .  
D~D' 
k c~*  
. . .  (w~R" AP= P~(w))... 
A R '~O 
[<__n 
. . .  w2 q~ Da( wl) 
A V p (d ' ,w)=n 
d,6D ~ 
Note: The same type of  error in (4.3.12.7). 
743, (4.3.12.4) 
V V (w l=wi , ' ,  
• " " (wb. . . ,w . )~D ¢~'¢ i~ i<n 
W 2 = Wi+l )  ) 
745, (4.3.!4.1) 
. . .  V 
(w~, . . . ,w . )eD~ " . . 
769, (4.4.7.3) 
• .. ( i , j )  = kd'~(w)} 
81 i, !ine 7 
... forms that low P-dominate forms... 
842, (4.5.8.4) 
. . .  A FZ'(w) C FZ'(w')} 
842, (4.5.8.5) 
. . .  A FZ~(w ') C FZ'(w)} 
851, (4.5.14.5) 
. . . .  {w ' lweW. . .  
856, line 4 from bottom 
. . .  D ~e ( (d ju)  includes D u' (eciju); . . . 
879, line 10 
The set lqm(w).. .  
914, (4.6.17.6) 
. . .  A Dc~(c ,s )~W~O} 
e~C c~a 
V V (wl = w;. A 
" (wL . . , ,w , )~D ~ l< i<n 
w~ = w; + ~)} 
• . .  V 
(w~ , . . . ,  w , )~D~ " . . 
. . .  ( i , j )  = kd"(hl, h2)} 
... forms that bound low P-dominate forms... 
. . .  t, (v~'(w), U ' (w ' ) )~O~' )  
. . .  A (FZ'(w'); FZ ' (w) )ED z'} 
. . . .  (wqw'~W. . .  
• . .  D ~P ( (d ju)  includes Dte (otct0; . . .  
The set Hm(w) . . .  
... A (Dc~(c,s)~W ~0 
cEC c'a 
V DC~(c ,  S) = 0) ]  
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914,  (4 .6 .18 .1)  
. . .^w~W a N DC*(C,s)} . . .^  V w~W*C~DC~(C,s')) 
s '~P(s )  
Note :  The above mistake const i tutes a confus ion between noun word  types (s) 
and  the parad igms belonging to them. This  flaw reappears in (4.6.25.1), (4.6.27.1); 
possibly,  the parad igm reading was in tended at several o ther  places, too. 
935, (4.6.29.4) 
• . .S=SU•. .  
946, line 17 
... may possess differem case systems... 
987, line 5 
• . .  agreement in predicates. . .  
1031, 1.4-3 from bottom 
. . .  as (k', 'q'), where (k', 'q')EA V: 
1107, line 21-22 
... (5.4.15) generates the independent... 
1115, 1. 1-2 
• . .  or accusative. . .  
1122, lines 5 and 7 
"F(' q')' 
1124, (5.42.1) 
F K has not been defined for two argu- 
ments. I assume it must be defined as 
follows: 
1125 
" have been omitted with C K several 
times• 
1128, (5.46.9) 
. . .  'FK+('q') '} 
I137, (5.50.1) 
. . . 'C '  c "Q'...  
1153, 1.4 from bottom 
•. .  and the nominative. 
1154, 1. 17 from bottom 
(5/64/4) 
1158, 1. 18 
.. • is wholly invoNed. . .  
1208, (B.6) 
. . .  (x) I (x) ^ . . .  
1209, (B.7) 
. . .  (((b. a, 'q 'ET . . .  
1209, (B.7) 
. . ,  V . . •  
~a '~T 
1209, (B. 10) 
. . .  r h('g2') E P 'd ' )  
. . .~=SU. . .  
• . .  may possess different gender systems.. .  
• . .  agreement in attributive connections 
. . .  as (k, 'q'), where (k, 'q')EA L~: 
• . .  (5.33.1) generates the independent. .  
. . .  or locat ive. . .  
'F~(,q,) •
FK('p ', "q') = {('r', 's') l 'r' U'P '  ^  
s E 'Q' ^  W('p', "q') = W('r', 's') 
. . .  'fuK+('¢') "} 
• • • 'C' c X*('Q') .... where X*  designates 
the power  set. 
• . .  and the accusative. 
(5/64/1) 
•. .  is only partially involved. . .  
. . .  (x) l (x )~T^. . .  
. . .  (((b• a, 'q ' )~T . . .  
• . .  V . . . 
d~F*  
. . .  r h('gS)'@P'd'} 
GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES AND THE METHODOLOGY OF LINGUISTICS 373 
Note: In (B.10), 'y'  and 'h'  are obviously intended to be homomorphisms. 
However ,  no dist inction between (semantic) particles as types and as tokens 
(occuring in a specific configuration) is made, so that (B.10), (B. t l ) ,  (B.15), 
(B.23)-(B.25) work correctly only under the counter intuit ive premise that in the 
semantic  onfigurations appearing in these definit ions any semantic particle may 
occur only once. 
1211, line 11 
.o .each consisting of two ordered 
pairs. . .  
1211, (B.17) 
. . .  ^ 'x '=  'Zo')) 
1211, (B.18) 
. . .  (a = z 1 v a = x, v a = Yl)) 
1211, I. 6 from bottom 
Our new set of words consisting of a 
lexical complex and an ending is: 
1211, (B.21) 
. . .  V (a=z ,  va=x lva=y l ) )  
(z,)eT z
1218, (B.37)/(B.38) 
These definitions work only if, for any 'z', 
there is exactly one z such that (z, °z') E T ~M, 
i.e., if synonymy is excluded. For an amend- 
ment, replace.. .  I (z) ~ T OM.. by: 
. . .  each consisting of two elements.. .  
. . A ~X'  ~ ~X0'  } 
. . .  ((a) = (z~) v (a) = (xl) v (a) = (y~))}. [This 
definition still allows for signs larger than 
words containing words with zero-ending, 
though this was probably not intended.] 
Our new set of strings of T~ with a meaning 
is: 
. . .  (a)ET z } 
• . . t  V (z,'z')@T°m... 
z~L1 
374 PETER MEYER 
NOTES 
1 The Russian term is TeopemuJco-.unoxcecmeettna~ tutco.~a or Ilhcoaa Kyaaeuno~t. The term 
s c h o o 1 is somewhat misleading, however. The contributors tothe Set-theoretical enterprise formed, 
according to the author, a loose and unorganized network of researchers, "dispersed over Central and 
Eastern Europe, and dispersed over various disciplines and types of institutions" (p. 1179), there being 
no single founder or leader, institutional centre, nor acknowledged reference work of the movement. 
- -  The school is associated with the name of O.S. Kulagina, since her only contribution to this field 
of research, viz., her (1958) paper, is usually claimed to have initiated the school. 
2 Kolmogorov is otherwise better known for having, amongst other things, laid the axiomatic 
foundations ofmodem probability theory. He never published his own ideas pertaining to linguistics. 
An account of them was given in an important paper by V.A. Uspenskij (I957/1993). 
3 On the term m o d e I, see ch, 1,0 of van Helden's book (p. 138-49). 
4 Strictly speaking, F is a function of N into X*(X*(C))(F:N ~ X*(X*(C))); X*(M) here symbolizes 
the power set of a set M. Moreover, aformalization of the set of word forms for each n ~N is missing 
in the above discussion. Such a formalization, however, will turn out to be pointless, as the formal 
notions to be introduced in due course will not depend on such word form sets. I will claim that F 
does not hinge upon such sets in any formalizable way. Moreover, I presume F cannot be further 
characterized in set-theoretical terms. 
5 Here circularity seems to crop up. Note, however, that there is a fundamental difference between 
'distinguishing case phenomena from non-case phenomena' nd 'determining the set of cases', the 
former being a necessary prerequisite for the latter. 
6 Of course, admission of nouns may be problematic for semantic reasons; see section 2.3.3 for 
some notes on grammaticality. My model will also yield reasonable r sults when a narrow conception 
of grammaticality is preferred. - -  Note that, as long as we maintain a nal've concept of 'context', 
some rather strange results are inavoidable, such as/</auxy 6o~butoe... being grouped as accusative 
and nominative. 
7 The inavoidable permanent change, in any exposition, between theory -externa l  terrnstaken 
from linguistic tradition r 'intuition' in one instance and theory - in terna l  terms with a formal 
definition in the next constitutes a serious problem. It has been solved well by van Helden, who uses 
technical terms for all of the numerous theory-internal constructs introduced. See also p. 136-7, 
s As is obvious, our formal approach cannot provide us with 1 a b e I s for cases. Any labels we 
might attribute to them would be completely anguage-specific (applicable onlyin this or that concrete 
situation) or extens iona l ,  as van Helden has it (p. 225). 
9 The bulk of the work was executed for the preparation ofa PhD thesis 1978-1980. 
10 Still, some relevant publications have gone unmentioned by the anthor, e.g. Seidel (1988), 
Kempgen (1981), or the works of A.K. Polivanova (cf. 1985, 1989, 1990); Boguslawski (1993) and 
Hubenschrnid (1993) appeared too late to be registered. 
1~ There seem to remain some, though, admittedly, few typos in the reference section. One example 
I found is Kulagina 1958, which is referred to on p. 1024, not 1028 (see entry on p. 1243). 
12 A full-fledged glossary remains an urgent desideratum for a study as rich and detailed as this one. 
With the help of the index alone, details (e.g., thediscussion of the Estonian comitative and abessive 
as two putatively identically distributed cases, cf. p. 335), are virtually irretrievable. Sometimes there 
are inconsistencies: thus, though the opposition of homonymy and syncretism plays an important role 
in part 5 (vol. II), only the latter term has been included in the index, and only with a reference to 
vol. I. 
Additionally, a list of mathematical symbols as employed in the study would perhaps have been 
useful. 
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13 Thus, van Helden does not introduce the usual bracket omission conventions for 'V'/ 'A and 
'U'/'(? ', which is necessary to understand, e.g., (1.1.2.25) on p. 157. It should have been mentioned 
on p. 157 that 'a ~ b' is equivalent m ' ,  (a A -,b)'. On p. 163 sqq., the distinction between the t rms 
firreflexive' and 'antireflexive' should have been made explicit m avoid misunderstandings. 
14 Note, incidentally, that certain variants of Government and Binding (GB) Theory support a 
relational interpretation. Generally, structural constraints in GB only say whether a given structure 
is well-folrned or not, they do not tell us how to produce them. A case in point is the so-called 
representational view of Move-a (von Stechow / Sternefeld 1988, 243 sqq.). But even here an 
algorithmic interpretation, in which the representational view amounts to a recognition syntax, is 
probably to be preferred. 
I5 Take the Peano axiomatization for the set N of positive integers, which probably is an instance 
of a relational model in the author's terminology. Since the Peano axioms must be formulated in 
second-order predicate logic, which is provably incomplete according to A. Church, not all true 
sentences about positive integers are deducible in a finite number of steps, so that there is no 
algorithmic model for the properties of N that corresponds to the relational one. 
16 It is obvious that the elements of W must be t y p e s, not t o k e n s (p. 256). 
17 Thus, van Helden implicitly assumes that traditional linguistic oncepts are of empiricai interest, 
which is debatable. Note that disentangling the bundles of grammatical features (i.e., identifyng the 
features themselves) is not so much at stake in part 2. 
18 On p. 424-5, van Helden introduces six different concepts of 'word', making a word form / lexicaI 
meaning / abstract word form distinction on the one hand, and a type / token distinction the other. 
This careful differentiation strongly recommends itself for common use m linguistics. 
19 One will, of course, run into difficulties with words like 6axayutu and 6umb 6alcJtyu~u, which 
no iexical meaning can be attributed to at all (p. 448). 
z0 See Corbett 1991 for a comprehensive treatment of such phenomena. 
2l One of the models presented, viz., Marcus' case model (p. 537-8), is quite similar to the one I 
proposed above in 1.3, if one takes the F(n) to be determined directly by the distribution of word 
forms. My maximality condition, however, tackles context syncretism (p. 540) in an adequate way, 
in contrast to Marcus' model. 
22 Obviously, immediate constituent s ructure analysis has not been exptored in the Set-tt~eoretical 
School, apart from configuration anaIysis as presented below. This is probably a field worth 
investigating; see Grunig 1981 for a proof that (at least in her axiomatic fl'amework) dependency 
structure turns out to be i n s t a b 1 e in the sense that at all 'neuralgic points' it 'turns into' constituent 
structure. 
23 The author's definition of li;[ 4 has been slightly simplified for the purposes of this article. 
24 caO and omet 4 belong to different agreement classes, but to the same gender, viz., masculine. 
Though van Helden doesn't make it explicit, it should be obvious that this model is tailored to the 
specific circumstances found in some Slavic languages, esp. Russian; it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to uphold similar distinctions for other, say Bantu or Caucasian, languages. In fact, the 
bulk of part 4.6 is devoted to this distinction and to a possible semantic core of 'gender' (p, 973 sqq.), 
taking sentences like rnbt .~OazoOaa, where gender assignment is obviously based on natural sex 
distinctions, as a starting point. Van Helden seriously considers the possibility that gender might be 
an e n t i r e 1 y semantically conditioned phenomenon (p. 972), anticipating the semantics discussion 
in part 5 of the study. 
25 Obviously, states abstract from indexical aspects and context-theoretical problems (see Kaplan 
1977) as much as objects are conceptualized asdeprived of referential properties. Yet it cannot be 
excluded a priori that case selection might depend exactly on features of referentiality, e.g. with 
direct objects in negated Russian sentences. There might be serious phiiosophical difficulties hidden 
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here. 
26 To be precise, a pair (w, 'p') is a word form if and only if there is at least one ordered quadruple 
m E M such that w and 'p' are its first and third component, respectively. 
27 If one thinks of no~ast and uo~oe as forms of one noun, then this noun would have to be treated 
analogously to, e.g, tuu.~nauae (m.f.n.); the whole matter is perhaps a question of taste. 
28 The influence of these phonological properties (in particular, underlying final palatalized consonant 
segment) on the dependent oun cannot be accounted for in terms of the general morphonological 
properties of Irish, but are specific to this syntactic onstruction. 
t9 Another problem, the so-called adprepositionaI cases of Russian, is discussed at very great length 
in the study, cf, p. 1076 sqq. 
30 van Helden does not, in general, count among these grammarians, nor does Jakobson, cf. p. 1219. 
31 van Helden himself quite often succumbs to category mistakes, speaking of "states with preposi- 
tions" (p. 1140) or of words in states (p. 1141). 
32 To name but a few: linguistic signs must be contiguous phoneme chains on the expression plane; 
inflection of words always involves ndings (prefixing is not considered); in the pre-desinential part 
of a word, the first and last phoneme never change in inflection; in semantic onfigurations, no 
semantic atom may occur more than once. 
33 I dare say that the two crucial sentences in these lines allow for more than 1024 (210) different 
readings, a p a r t f r o m quantifier underspecification as acknowledged by van Helden. 
34 Would the author, in a future edition of the study, provide explicit answers to at least he following 
questions about what is said on p. 1151: Are the members of grammatical categories sets of internal 
meanings or sets of sets of internal meanings? May a state possess more than one set of internal 
meanings? How on earth can the 'equivalence classes' of sets of internal meaning be defined only 
through 'compatibility with lexemes' and then be elements(!) of grammatical categories? What 
exactly is supposed to correspond to them in appendix B? 
35 In fact, on p. 1161 he claims that he has assumed "so far" that separate internal meanings are 
joined into a 'case feature' "when they condition ident i ca l  behav iour  fo r  a l l  nouns"  
(emphasis mine, EM.). This plainly contradicts everything said before in the chapter and will strike 
the reader as incomprehensible. No notion of "identical behaviour" is available for internal case 
definitions, ince identical behaviour can only be defined in distributional terms: Even if no noun has 
more than two word forms, there might, theoretically, still be any number of different distributional 
cases, so that word forms alone do not suffice to account for the behaviour of lexemes. Moreover, 
only lexically determined case systems have been discussed "so far", which is incompatible with a 
for-all-condition. 
36 Consider ahypothetical situation where two different cases of a language occur only as governed 
by certain prepositions, no preposition governing both cases. 
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